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Introduction 
 
[T]hey were not actors. They had been chosen; or they themselves had chosen their 
roles in this sacred story that would go on for nine afternoons over a two-hour period 
till the sun set. They were not amateurs but believers ... They believed in what they 
were playing, in the sacredness of the text, the validity of India, while I, out of the 
writer's habit, searched for some sense of elegy, of loss, even of degenerative mimicry 
in the happy faces of the boy-warriors or the heraldic profiles of the village princes. I 
was polluting the afternoon with doubt and with the patronage of admiration. I misread 
the event through a visual echo of History - the cane fields, indenture, the evocation of 
vanished armies, temples, and trumpeting elephants - when all around me there was 
quite the opposite: elation, delight in the boys' screams, in the sweets-stalls, in more 
and more costumed characters appearing; a delight of conviction, not loss. The name 
Felicity made sense.1 
 
The writer is the St Lucian poet Derek Walcott, and Felicity is a small village 
in Trinidad that lies within the borough of Chaguanas, so named after the Carib tribe 
of that area. Walcott has come across a hinterland populated by one set of historically 
transplanted peoples. Walcott catches himself contaminating the hinterland with a 
colonially induced scepticism, and he asks why could it not be the case that these 
people in the cane fields of Trinidad could blissfully inhabit India?  No doubt, if 
Walcott walked some way over the hills he might chance upon another hinterland 
populated by descendants of a different set of forcibly displaced peoples. They would 
be chanting sacred texts around a fire accompanied by “harps” (drums) affirming, this 
time, the validity of Africa. There would be joy in their hearts, too. And there would 
also be a sense of conviction, in this instance, that the evil of their crossing over the 
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Atlantic still had to be exorcised. One of their members might rise and proclaim 
something along these lines:   
 
For from I start I no fe stop till I see the place mash dung ‘cause our determination is as 
Babylon! An’ da’s why Nyahbinghi Order a one Order fe bruck dung Babylon wall 
yuknow. Da’s why yu chant an’ chant an’ never stop chant ‘till you hear Boo boo boo 
boom!!!!!2 
 
Another Caribbean poet, Édouard Glissant, speaks of these hinterlands.3 They 
have their origins as geographical places of maroonage (hills and forests beyond the 
plantation complex) but over time they might become ancestral grounds.4 Their 
spatiality is constituted not just geographically but socially, linguistically, 
psychologically in so far as hinterlands protect people from – or simply defer the 
moment of - being terminally incorporated into colonial rule. In fact, the constitution 
of hinterlands might vary greatly in terms of time and place. It is a specific kind of 
hinterland that Walcott comes across in Felicity, one wherein the text of India still 
retains a geographical grounding. But hinterlands might be retained even when their 
geographical mooring is entirely uprooted. Then hinterlands become subversively 
mobile; their spatial seedbed is in the psyche and its community coordinates, and so 
these hinterlands can suddenly manifest around a camp fire, a portable tabernacle, or 
even within a drum circle when Babylon is chanted down.  
 
John Locke would not understand this notion of hinterland. To him, anything 
outside of the rule of propertied “freemen” would be termed wilderness. Locke is the 
exemplary architect of colonial rule. As envisaged by Locke, this rule is dispensed, 
centrally, from the master’s house and radiates outwards in myriad directions to 
ensnare and enclose various aliens, subalterns and their land and labour. Locke closes 
the colonial frontiers and drags all of them out of their various hinterlands to serve the 
master in his pursuit of accumulation. Ashis Nandy and Frantz Fanon resist this pull. 
They side, in a critical fashion, with those who live through the epics of India and the 
chants to Africa-Zion. However, Nandy and Fanon’s projects emanate from different 
positions vis-à-vis Locke’s architecture; they engage with different hinterlands, 
differentially situated vis-à-vis colonial rule, and this leads Nandy and Fanon to 
 3 
cultivate different ethos through which to dismantle the architecture of the master and 
redeem a space for living other-wise.   
 
I wish to present my engagement with Locke, Fanon and Nandy as a thought 
piece that will allow us to critically evaluate the fate of Bandung and reconsider the 
prospects of its decolonial spirit. The Asian-African conference held in Indonesia in 
1955 has long been a touchstone for academic engagements with colonialism, 
decolonisation and postcoloniality.5 Enunciating anti-colonialism and anti-racism as 
key policies for the transformation of global order within the Cold War world, and 
using the instruments of “neutrality” and “non-alignment”, the Bandung conference is 
often said to have announced the arrival of the Third World solidarity movement. In 
contrast to the contemporaneous US dominated South East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), the Bandung conference marked the diplomatic arrival on the Cold War 
stage of (post)colonized peoples relating to each other without the mediation of past 
masters.6 Claiming to represent the majority of humanity, this movement promised to 
generate alternative futures arrived at through the principles of equality over 
hierarchy, peace over war, cooperation over conflict, and self-determination over 
dependency.7  Through this “spirit of Bandung” the hinterlands of the (post)colonized 
proposed to break free from the global architecture laid by the colonizer.   
 
Yet as Robert Vitalis has recently argued, to take the heroic intervention of 
Bandung at face value is to court Third World romanticism at the expense of the 
historical record – the conference was not strictly non-aligned and neither was it 
guided by a global race consciousness.8 Moreover, as a number of postcolonial 
authors have noted, the paradox of the conference was that it took the key method of 
self-determination from blueprints of the masters’ architecture: the enabling 
institution was to be the nation-state; and the process was to be “development” or 
“modernization”.9 Internal hinterlands would be laid bare and the colonial frontier 
finally closed by postcolonial elites. What is more, some of the new independence 
leaders then began to use violent methods similar to those deployed by old colonial 
masters.10  
 
The fate of the Bandung spirit therefore exposes the postcolonial predicament: 
(how) can one orient towards decolonised futures; (how) can the logic of coloniality 
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be broken without its reproduction/reiteration, and (how) is it possible to cultivate and 
defend a space that is ordered other-wise to colonial architecture? Presently these 
questions seem almost naive in light of the 2005 retrospect of Bandung, convened by 
original participating states, many of which are now almost fully integrated into – and 
in some cases key players in - the globalisation of Locke’s architecture.11 
 
  If, as Walcott intonates, History is to be understood as a colonial-modern 
episteme that maps the past by following principally the cause and effect of masters,12 
then the effect of Bandung has long dissipated (if it was ever even an effect). But 
alternatively, as Mustapha Pasha argues, the past can also be present as memory, and 
in this respect, Bandung might remain subversively alive as a promise of “subaltern 
solidarity forged through anti-colonial struggle”.13 Memory is not strictly sequential 
and, unlike History, can act as a generative seedbed of relationality. In this respect, 
Bandung would remind us that (post-)colonized peoples might want to cultivate 
relatable hinterlands – physical and/or psychical – in pursuit of global designs other-
wise to the architecture of colonial rule. In the Historical present, Bandung has been 
complicit in closing the frontiers, dragging natives out of their hinterlands into the 
global architecture of postcolonial rule. But in the remembered present, Bandung 
marks the possibility of the peoples of these hinterlands cultivating decolonial 
relations besides and other-wise to postcolonial architecture. Hence, the History of 
Bandung affirms a postcolonial fate and the death of its spirit. But in the Memory of 
Bandung the spirit continues to enliven what Walter Mignolo has termed a 
“decolonial option”.14  
 
In this article I critically enliven the Memory of Bandung through my 
discussion of Locke, Nandy and Fanon. I will first lay out the colonial architecture 
that Locke constructs around the master’s – or “freeman’s” household and its 
attendant relationships to “natives” and “negro slaves”. (These are terms that are 
consonant with Locke’s vision and as heuristic devices I do not write them in quotes 
nor do I claim any anthropological validity on their behalf.) Then I will turn to Nandy 
and Fanon. Mindful of the challenges of postcoloniality, I will emplot both of their 
intellectual projects within Locke’s architecture so as to apprehend the ways in which 
they attempt to dismantle the freeman’s order and the degree to which they consider it 
possible to redeem the hinterlands of the colonized, especially in their psychical 
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constitution. However, I shall also argue that both Nandy and Fanon fall short of 
redeeming relatable hinterlands. Nandy focuses on the hinterlands that might be 
associated with the native, and he is known for his articulation of subversion of the 
freeman’s rule as a practice of radical reconciliation. Fanon focuses on the hinterlands 
that might still be available to the negro slave, and he is famous for his articulation of 
subversion practiced as exorcism of the freeman. Both, however, forgo the cultivation 
of a dialogical relationship between the native and the slave.   
 
Only rarely are the praxes of Nandy and Fanon placed in meaningful 
dialogue.15 In constructing such a dialogue in the shadow of Locke’s freeman I intend 
to enliven the Memory of Bandung and its promise of anti-colonial solidarity with a 
decolonial impulse. In an era where the logic of coloniality has been re-globalized as 
neo-liberal capitalism, critical thought on the postcolonial predicament risks 
becoming accomplice through an epistemic obsession with the self/other 
master/subaltern (non-)relation. As a thought piece, then, the aim of this article is to 
consolidate a problematique of decolonial thought as the critical retrieval of relatable 
hinterlands. In this way, I hope that the article helps to redeem the spirit of Bandung 
against the melancholia of postcolonial history. 
 
Locke’s architecture of colonial rule 
 
 The more recent acknowledgement of the central importance of colonialism 
and slavery in Locke’s writings significantly qualifies the older leftist 
contextualization of his thought vis-à-vis primitive accumulation in England and the 
concomitant rise of capitalism.16 Locke cognitively works out the rights and 
obligations of primitive accumulation by reference to the specific rights and 
obligations of colonialism, and as part of the broader colonizing and proselytizing 
project that the English crown is embarking upon in earnest.  This is the world that 
Locke’s freeman inhabits within an architecture that permits various inscribed 
relationships to natives and negro slaves. The foundation of Locke’s architecture is a 
justification and securing of the political rule of propertied men in a form consonant 
to the property-owning rights that they enjoy under English common law.  
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For this purpose, Locke defines political rule in classical sovereign terms as 
the power to make laws with the consequence of death.17 He claims that such 
sovereign power should not be devoted to the maintenance of royal prerogative and 
privilege, but rather to the “regulating and preserving of property”. 18 Locke frames 
his argument as a critique of Robert Filmer, who makes an argument for a divine 
(Adamic) patriarchal authority of royalty over freemen. Against this authority, Locke 
claims instead that the original condition of all humanity is to be “free from any 
superior power on earth”, especially, to be under “no dominion of any will” save for 
legislative arrangements entered into by free consent.19 Reason dictates that “all being 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or 
possessions”.20 And because there is no original title to dominion over creation, its 
objects, for Locke, form part of a common stock.  
 
There is, however, one exception: “every man has a property in his own 
person”. This exceptionalism produces a further claim: that once man mixes his 
labour with an object in the common stock, he rightfully possesses that object 
privately and absolutely.21 The basis of rights, and what enables freedom to be 
actualised, is, then, possessive accumulation. I say “possessive”, because unlike his 
contemporaries such as Grotius, Locke does not require individual property 
ownership to rest on the consent of anyone else.22 It is not, then, political hierarchy 
which for Locke justifies the accumulation of property by freemen but the law of 
nature; political society might or might not reasonably accord to this law. 
Furthermore, the constitution of the state of nature is represented by Locke most 
acutely in the wildernesses of America:23  
 
[t]he fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is 
still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no 
longer have any right to it.24  
 
In this respect, Locke does not erect political society in order to decompose the state 
of nature: they are, for him, contemporaneous arenas with empirical – and global - 
reference points. 
 
 7 
Locke’s architecture includes one more arena of rights and rule – that of the   
pater familias. Ron Becker has shown that Locke’s category of “free – man” relates to 
the basic common law compact made after the legal end of serfdom in England, while 
in distinction, Locke’s category of “freeman” represents those who are specifically 
empowered to form a government, i.e. those who enjoy political rights and 
representation by virtue of being propertied men of independent means.25 It is hard to 
glean in Locke’s political philosophy a strong structural line of argumentation that 
explicates the transformation from (natural) free – man to (political) freeman. I would 
argue that this is because the purpose of common law, as it developed during the long 
decades of English enclosure, was to provide a via media between, on the one hand, 
the protection of inherited property and the associated paternal order through which 
society was fundamentally constituted, and on the other hand, the freedom (against 
monarchical orders) to utilize and even alienate one’s private property as one saw 
fit.26 In short, Locke’s freeman is specifically an inheritor: he is already propertied 
and already a pater familias.  
 
Locke manages to interlock the paternal constitution of the freeman with 
natural law and political society by separating the household of the   pater familias 
from the palace of the monarchy. To underline this distinction, Locke makes the claim 
that women have as much natural dominion over their children as fathers.27 Therefore, 
unlike monarchical rule, the   pater familias does not exercise political - sovereign - 
powers of life and death over his wards.28 Furthermore, Locke suggests that the first 
(non-political) society was between man and wife, then parents and children, which 
“in time” began the master and servant relationship. However, all of these paternal 
relationships came short of the sovereignty demanded by political society.29 By this 
reasoning, the freeman’s right to possessively accumulate objects out of the common 
stock extends to the labour of all who are encompassed within the authority of the   
pater familias. This is why Locke can state – ostensibly against the law of nature – 
that “the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have 
digged … become my property, without the assignation or consent of anyone.”30   
 
In sum, Locke places the right to possessive accumulation held by the freeman 
within a threefold interlocking architecture covering home and abroad: the state of 
nature, the household of the   pater familias, and political society. It is a global vision 
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of colonial incorporation wherein the rest of humanity finds itself differentially placed 
within and variously excluded from these arenas.  
 
What moral arguments might justify the unique privileges of the freeman? 
Locke claims that the purpose of possessive accumulation, as ordained by God, is “to 
subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life”.31 And to improve nature 
requires the observance of private property rights. Famously, Locke compares 1000 
acres of “wild woods and uncultivated waste” in America to 10 acres of enclosed land 
in Devonshire. In the former, natives have yet to instantiate property rights concordant 
to possessive accumulation, and so even their patriarchs live in more wretched 
conditions than the servants of England.32 The “success” of possessive accumulation 
at home, through enclosures, legitimises the same procedures abroad, through 
colonialism.  
 
Nevertheless, Locke acknowledges that, with few commons now left in 
England, there is little opportunity for freemen to exercise their right to possessive 
accumulation.33 And he notes that the invention of money in England has even led to 
the valuing of property by tacit agreements which have tended to encourage even 
larger possessions by some men.34 This is a problem for Locke, whose use of natural 
law against monarchical rule requires a reconciliation of the limitless accumulation 
with an egalitarian ethics that ensures all freemen can reap their just rewards. He finds 
a solution, once more, through colonial expansion. Locke points out that wilderness 
still exist in those parts of the world whose inhabitants have not consented to the use 
of money.35 His famous proclamation, “in the beginning all the world was 
America”,36 is therefore not so much a reference to a primeval past as it is an 
invitation for freemen to exercise their natural right of possessive accumulation in the 
colonies with their expanding frontiers.37   
  
But what of the non-propertied - the free – men? Here Locke justifies the 
machinery of possessive accumulation not so much via improvement but through the 
teaching of industriousness. “God”, proclaims Locke, “gave [the world] to the use of 
the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or 
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.”38 Industriousness speaks to 
Locke’s Puritanical ascetic translated through natural law. Indeed, Locke attributes 
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the rise of the poor in England not to the consequences of enclosure, i.e. the creation 
of unemployment as a social ill, but to the “relaxation of discipline and corruption of 
manners”.39 For Locke, “virtue and industry [are] as constant companions on the one 
side as vice and idleness are on the other”; hence the poor have to be returned to 
“some sense of” religious instruction in order to be trained into industriousness.40  
 
To facilitate this project Locke again turns to the colonies, this time through 
his proposal on reforms to the poor laws in England. Those poor who beg within 
maritime counties should forcibly be made to serve for a period in the navy.41  And 
those who consistently take part in vice should be transplanted to the plantations.42  
Indeed, there is something about the supposed pristine nature of the colonial 
enterprise that invokes in Locke a proselytizing fervour.43 In effect, is in the colonies 
that he can politically proclaim what he can only propose philosophically in England.  
Locke approaches the colonial enterprise as a mission spirituelle.44 The right of the 
freeman to possessive accumulation also brings with it a responsibility to save and 
civilize humanity at large.  
 
  I will now detail how particular subalterns are positioned vis-à-vis the freeman 
in Locke’s three interlocking arenas - the state of nature, house of the pater familias 
and political society – and how he justifies their differentiated positioning in the 
overall architecture through an ideology of improvement/industriousness.  In this 
endeavour I am influenced by the work of Barbara Arneil, although my purposes 
differ somewhat.45    
 
Locke places the servant under the protective covering of nature as a free – 
man. However, even if enjoying a formally contractual relationship, the servant falls 
under the authority of the paternal order of the contractor.46 Whilst this means that the 
master has no sovereign authority over the servant in terms of life or death, the master 
is morally obliged to perform the responsibilities of his paternal authority. In light of 
his comments on poor law reform, these responsibilities, for Locke, primarily consist 
of using discipline to raise the character of servants by educating them in the 
(economic and religious) virtue of industriousness.47  
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When it comes to American natives, Locke treats them similar to servants and 
places them also within the state of nature because they display basic reason; i.e. they 
too are free - men.48 For this reason, natives cannot be enslaved. However, unlike 
servants, in the absence of a consensual contract, natives cannot be forcefully 
dispossessed of the fruits of their labour.  Nevertheless, because natives believe in a 
God, they have at least the potential to join political society. So Locke invokes the 
practice of tolerance in order to regulate the relationship between natives and freemen 
and also to bind the former to the latter in a paternal order (through contract) or 
colonial political society (via consent).49 Yet Locke values tolerance only in 
instrumental terms; the discourse that is facilitated by tolerance will acquaint 
“heathens” with “the truth and reasonableness of [Christian] doctrines.”50 Of this, 
Locke is supremely confident.51 And if natives do not disavow their own faiths and do 
not incorporate themselves into the paternal body of Christ, then they can no longer 
be considered to be rational beings, and thus would lose their status of free - men 
under Locke’s natural law.  Just like the Spanish Requerimiento, then, Locke’s 
mission spirituelle allows for the possibility of genocide in the long run.  
 
Moreover, even in the immediate present, natives – as free – men - have no 
prior claim to sovereignty or proprietorship over their already inhabited lands and 
already regulated resources. For Locke the matter is not adjudicated by generic 
evidence of techniques of production, but rather, of improvement via possessive 
accumulation evidenced by private property rights. Additionally, Locke does not even 
classify the ceremonial form of exchange practiced by natives (Wampompeke) as a 
form of money exchange.52 Hence, unlike in England, natives in America run the 
moral risk of greed – their accumulated properties cannot be transformed into money 
and will therefore spoil. Despite being tolerated, then, natives can be immediately, 
rightfully and legally disposed of the lands and resources that they inhabit.    
   
 Locke’s positioning of negro slaves vis-à-vis English freemen is 
perhaps the most contentious and confounding aspect of his entire architecture. As I 
have noted, Locke’s key device for justifying rule of and by freemen in the face of 
monarchical “slavery” (he uses this term) is to claim the natural freedom of all 
humans and the impossibility of voluntarily giving oneself up to enslavement. There 
is, though, one circumstance in which Locke believes this to be permissible, and that 
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is with respect to those who, being captured in war, would consent to the “absolute 
dominion and arbitrary power of their masters” rather than being put to death. Such 
individuals rationally forfeit their natural status as free men for the sake of survival.53 
Slaves cannot, therefore, take part in possessive accumulation as they cannot own 
property. Moreover, the paternal order to which they forfeit themselves in this 
peculiar instance overlaps directly with political order in so far as the master holds the 
sovereign power of life or death over them: the pater familias is a pater familias rex. 
In this key respect negro slaves differ to natives (and servants).   
 
Locke derives his “war captive” argument from Grotius’s adoption of Roman 
law. However, Locke tempers this law by refuting the assumption that the right of 
dominion applies to the offspring of captive slaves.54 Nevertheless, Locke makes a 
“glaring exception” when he allows for the inherited dominion over slaves gained by 
purchase rather than by war.55 The fundamental constitutions of Carolina - the 
drafting of which Locke significantly contributes to - state that “every freeman of 
Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what 
opinion or religion soever”.56 And unlike with case of the native, not even the 
civilizing force of Christian conversion will deliver them into the domain of natural 
law and grant them status as free men.57    
 
 To finish this section let us now revise Locke’s architecture, which binds 
servants, natives and negro slaves to the freeman. Improvement and industriousness 
provide the moral justification for possessive accumulation by freemen, who enjoy 
natural freedom, paternal authority and political authority. Natives are positioned 
outside of the political authority of freemen. But while they enjoy natural freedom 
they cannot rightfully be said to enjoy political authority over the lands and resources 
that they already inhabit for their subsistence. If they use their reason properly, and by 
virtue of the tolerance exercised by freemen, they could become incorporated into 
political society, there to learn through industriousness how to become good servants 
in the house of the pater familias. If they do not use reason properly and assimilate to 
the political, moral and spiritual order of freemen, they run the potential of being 
abjected from the natural and political order. Negro slaves are already abjected from 
natural law. They are positioned solely under the authority of the   pater familias who 
in this case is also the despotic sovereign: the   pater familias rex does not tolerate the 
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negro slave. Slaves can never escape this unfreedom, neither by material procreation 
nor by spiritual conversation.  
 
In these ways, Locke recognizes natives and negro slaves only to outlaw their 
hinterlands as wilderness or as outside of natural law thus closing the frontier and 
dragging them into the architecture of colonial rule. Moreover, in Locke’s writings, 
natives and slaves are segregated from each other both before they are incorporated 
into his architecture and in the act of incorporation itself. Before incorporation they 
occupy different domains – the native is situated within natural law, the slave without. 
Having been incorporated, the native might become a good servant to the freeman – 
perhaps even an aspiring pater familias – yet the negro will always be under the 
freeman’s absolute dominion.   Thus all particular routes converge on the freeman’s 
household; these hinterlands are not relatable, they cannot cross in solidarity.    
  
Nandy, Fanon and the possible hinterlands of natives and slaves 
 
Let us now examine how Nandy and Fanon confront Locke’s global project.  
For this purpose I will read Nandy as subverting Locke’s proposed relationship 
between the freeman and native, and Fanon as subverting the relationship between the 
freeman and the negro slave. And I will critically inquire into the extent to which their 
subversions conceive of the hinterlands as relatable. 
 
For Nandy, tradition can be considered a hinterland that displaces the 
“enlightenment mission” of modernity, i.e. the mission spirituelle proselytised by the 
colonizing freeman.58 Nandy famously proclaims that “India is not the non-West; it is 
India”.59 With this, he diffuses Locke’s wild horizon in order to glean the spaces of 
tradition that predate the arrival of the colonial freeman and which continue to retain 
some kind of integrity during colonial rule. Nandy even subverts the freeman’s 
eschatology with the viewpoint from these hinterlands: God has not ordained the 
world to the use of “the industrious and the rational”; indeed, the freeman is not even 
an “the all-important intruder” but only a transient ruler possessed by “illusions of 
permanence”.60 Moreover, it is not wilderness that is penetrated and conquered for 
God’s kingdom by freemen, rather, it is the freeman’s household that is surrounded by 
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a “definite presence of traditions, living vibrant and besieged but constantly 
threatening to rebound.”61  
 
Nandy then turns to those natives who have decided to become good native-
servants, perhaps even aspirant   pater familias. These peoples, who live urbanely and 
who may wish to live even more intimately with the   pater familias, also feel 
themselves besieged by the traditions of the hinterlands.62 Seeking to leave the 
villages for the urban both physically and psychically they - and their descendants 
especially – dull the pain of crossing thresholds through a fear of nostalgia for village 
life and/or a radical vision of a transplanted future.63  In defence, these good native-
servants – perhaps even apprentice pater-familias - attempt to colonize the texts of 
hinterland India by selecting out of them what might pass as compatible with the 
mission spirituelle of the colonial freeman.64 However, many untrained natives seem 
to wilfully defer or diffuse such comparisons in their own use of the texts of India, 
and this produces within the native-servants a “deep fear of democracy.”65  
 
Nandy’s work focuses on this aspirant group of natives mainly because he 
positions himself not just as an “urban, middle-class Bengali babu” but, effectively, as 
a traitorous native-servant.66 As such, Nandy must find an intellectual strategy to 
subvert colonial rule in a way that would not simply replace a foreign   pater familias 
with a domestic one. For this reason he is at pains to differentiate himself from the 
village habitants of the geographical hinterlands, stating that “they are quite capable 
of speaking for themselves.”67 Rather, with these interventions Nandy seeks to 
reaffirm basic democratic principles by supporting the legitimacy of the epistemes 
that are organic to native hinterlands and which might even travel subversively with 
natives on the road to urban areas.68 It is less the geographical spaces and more the 
psychic hinterlands of tradition that Nandy is concerned with redeeming, specifically 
as a way to unsettle the modernist illusions of native-servants. Nandy’s praxis of 
“critical traditionalism” 69 is therefore designed to facilitate “a journey into the 
interiors of self, to search for resources that may allow one to transcend the limits set 
by our times.”70   
 
Furthermore, through this praxis Nandy seeks to intimately subvert the 
relationship between the native and the freeman by replacing toleration with 
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reconciliation. Locke tolerates indigenous faiths only in so far as their existence 
proves that natives are potentially able to receive truth per se. Nandy roundly 
criticises such paternalistic practices. He does so by revealing them to be 
fundamentally intolerant and violent.71 Freemen, so sure of their eschatological 
purpose, can live with “anything but an attenuated role”.72 For this reason they never 
feel any mourning for the modes of life that they have displaced through 
colonization.73 And this is the reason why, for Nandy, the acts of violence emanating 
from the freeman’s household have usually far surpassed those emanating from native 
villages.74  
 
These subversive considerations impel a different sensibility to the 
relationship between the native / colonized and freeman / colonizer.75 Tolerance 
foisted upon non-believers by public displays and acknowledgements of the official 
gospel of the   pater familias – as demanded in Locke’s Carolina constitutions - must 
be put to one side. In its stead, an “apocryphal ear” must be developed.76 With the 
development of this faculty come two revelations. First, natives who seemingly make 
bad copies of the freeman’s catechisms are in fact acculturating them to native 
traditions in order to heal the wounds delivered by the mission spirituelle.77 Second, 
colonial freemen are not at all public in their confessions, but have secret Indian lives 
too, wherein the burden of living as a super-human being is laid down.78 In other 
words, freemen deny their humanity by alienating that native part of themselves 
which their mission spirituelle demands them to destroy.  
 
Against this disavowal of past/native lives in an escape to a pristine future, 
Nandy sketches out a different kind of utopia that instead seeks to critically redeem 
the ethical and practical possibilities of the hinterlands of tradition.79 Present suffering 
must be addressed by redemption of the past rather than ameliorated for the sake of 
imagined future progress.80 In this respect, the aspirant native-servant should have the 
self-confidence to put her critical thinking to internal use, rather than learn the violent 
ideology of improvement/industriousness in the household of the pater familias. This 
is why for Nandy utopia must essentially reside in the psyche as a “certain quality of 
thinking and living” rather than as a manifest totality.81 While Nandy’s site of 
exposition is firmly India, he nevertheless offers this praxis to all those suffering 
under the colonial condition globally, and I shall return to this gesture shortly.   
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 In sum, Nandy subverts Locke’s relation between the freeman and native in 
three ways. First, the eschatological narrative by which the freeman justifies future 
paternal rule over the wild native is undermined. Indeed, wilderness is enculturated 
with a relatable past ensconced in the rich hinterlands of traditions available even to 
native-servants. There can be no nature free to possess because it is already called 
India. Second, Nandy argues that the violence borne from the freeman’s possessive 
accumulation should not be apprehended by the native as foreign to her innocent 
nature; rather, she must take accountability for that violence in order to actively attend 
to its healing. No paternalism is possible, not even an expectation that the pater 
familias must attend to his rightful duties; tolerance is thereby rendered meaningless. 
Third, because the architecture which supported the uniqueness of the freeman’s 
household has now collapsed, the tenuous hinterlands of his own European society 
might come into vision, to be perhaps redeemed and reconciled with those of the 
colonized world.82 In short, the native and the freeman should reconcile so as to 
transform their relationship into something else. 
  
What of Nandy’s global gesture? At one point in his excursus on utopias, he 
takes Fanon to task for not reconciling with the freeman. Nandy admits that Fanon 
also works with the psyche as a possible hinterland, that is, a site of being other-wise. 
However, Fanon “calls for an exorcism in which the ghost outside has to be finally 
confronted in violence, for it carries the burden of the ghost within”.83 Nandy chides 
Fanon for misapprehending the organized violence of colonial rule as a tool for 
liberation rather than as a culture of oppression. And from the preceding discussion it 
is easy to understand why: exorcising the colonial freeman is precisely the strategy by 
which native-servants become ersatz domestic freemen and so the redemption of 
hinterlands by this method is at the same time their obliteration. In Nandy’s praxis, 
exorcism is the colonial completion of alienation from oneself and one’s hinterland, 
whereas reconciliation redeems the hinterlands for the critical purpose of transforming 
the present rule of freemen.  If only Fanon had had “more confidence in his [own] 
culture”, he would have realised this.84 
 
Nandy is correct about Fanon’s self-confidence; as we shall see, he invested 
little hope in the cultures of the once-enslaved peasants of the Caribbean hinterlands. 
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But Nandy’s critique is nevertheless provincial. He has read the native as 
representative of the universal colonial condition. However, Fanon has to come to 
terms with the relationship between the freeman and negro slave, not that of the 
native. In this particular relation, the freeman is not just pater familias but pater 
familias rex: the intimacy of the negro slave to the colonial freeman is defined not by 
paternal tolerance but by the sovereign right of death in the face of which not even 
Christ will save. Indeed, in so far as natural law does not protect her from this 
complete domination, the negro slave is not even a human being. There is no potential 
to rise to the status of servant, hence this particular relation of being/non-being has no 
immanent potential for reconciliation. Moreover, the slave trade has torn peoples from 
their African hinterlands and deposited them upon the plantations of America. In this 
context, Fanon questions whether the descendents of slaves have managed to retain a 
psychical hinterland and he is pessimistic. Thus, exorcism of the freeman might be the 
only and necessary path to create a liberated psychical space in which negro slaves 
might personify and humanize themselves.   
 
These anxieties form Fanon’s starting point in Black Skins, White Masks: “the 
black is not a man”, and where the “man” should be there instead lies “a zone of 
nonbeing”.85 By Fanon’s time, Martinique, his birthplace, now incorporated as a 
department of France itself, no longer legally supports the freeman’s sovereign rights 
of life and death over the slave. But Fanon argues that in social and psychological 
terms the ex-slave has yet to be affirmed her rightful place as a human under natural 
law. The negro attempts to overcome the non-being inflicted through slavery by 
making epidermalized comparisons.86 That is to say, rather than toleration the thin 
hope for incorporation of ex-slaves into the freeman’s household lies only in an 
impossible attempt to pass phenomenologically as white, and thus as human. The skin 
testifies to the inauthenticity of this hope.  
  
In order to dispel this false hope, Fanon questions the presumption of 
psychoanalysis that all psyches must be compared to that of the   pater familias. 
Instead, seeking to ground psychiatric method in the lived experience of the negro, 
Fanon argues that the determining relationship is really between colony and 
metropolis and not between child and father.87 These are the building blocks of 
Fanon’s distinctive “sociogenic” approach. It is designed to directly address what 
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Fanon assumes to be a colonial fact: not only the physical but the physic frontier too 
has been closed on the negro; they no longer have access to any viable hinterlands. 
Rather, the negro’s psyche has been overdetermined –overwhelmed - by the colonial 
relation that situates the white freeman as human and the black slave/Antillean negro 
as, by comparison, non-human. Hence, unlike the native, there are no living pasts or 
alternative selves in the hinterlands of tradition that could be redeemed. Fanon’s 
assumptions leave, therefore, only one subversive option left: to exorcise the 
sovereign dominion of the freeman from the psychic and social architecture of 
Antillean life; to exorcise the colonial relation itself; and through the necessary 
violence that this requires, to joyfully set afoot a brand new human being.88 Fanon’s 
“new humanism” will be cultivated in a liberated zone, not an extant hinterland.    
 
In light of Fanon’s experience of Locke’s architecture, Nandy’s ethos of 
reconciliation reveals itself to be provincial rather than global. Nevertheless, Nandy’s 
judgement still leaves Fanon with a challenge: where exactly might the Antillean 
negro find the resources through which to exorcise his non-being and create a 
liberated zone? Did the freeman, in the years of slavery, really destroy all the 
hinterlands? Did the plantation complex really flatten the psyche as well as the 
forests?  
 
The history of rebellion and maroonage in Martinique would seem to indicate 
that Fanon is too hasty in this regard. Glissant, fellow Martiniquan, although notably 
pessimistic about the capacity of Antillean societies to self-determine nevertheless 
works with the trope of maroonage. He identifies present day hinterlands in language 
and folklore, precarious and on the verge of being overwhelmed by French paternal 
culture, yet still, extant and offering at least potential reservoirs to power self-
determination.89 To this trope we should add a more generally observation that Black 
male Caribbean writers in the twentieth century have tended to fixate upon their 
absence in the white political society of colonial freemen; Black women writers, 
alternatively, have tended to look to the cultural resources of survival and resistance 
that have long dwelt in familial and personal hinterlands of enslaved communities and 
their descendants.90 Fanon shares this male fixation as well as its obfuscations when 
he admits that when it comes to the relationship between women of color and men of 
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color, “I know nothing about her.”91 For all these reasons Fanon’s lack of self-
confidence in the negro cultures of the Antilles is epistemically suspect.  
 
Nevertheless, with no cultivation of a new human seemingly possible upon the 
barren rocks of the Antilles, Africa beckons Fanon as an energetic source through 
which to power an exorcism of Western Babylon. Once he has found his way abroad 
into the Free French army during the World War, Fanon comes across real-existing 
French African troops. Yet his regiment is billeted separately to them, even though his 
epidermis constantly confesses to Europeans that he is no different.92 So by the time 
he is writing Black Skins Fanon has come to realise that the impossible hope of 
becoming a servant is being kept alive by the acceptance amongst Antillean negroes 
of the image of continental Africans disseminated by the paternal culture of the 
political society of colonial freemen.93  
 
In other words, so long as Antilleans can place themselves betwixt these “real” 
negroes - with their savagery, fetishism and tom-toms - and white Frenchmen, they 
can imagine themselves to be living in the house of the   pater familias as good 
servants rather than as abject slaves.94  Fanon must cut and clear through this 
misapprehension. He clarifies for Antilleans that they are not between white and black 
but rather betwixt black and black. What is more, Antilleans cannot find solace in the 
original continental hinterlands because continental Africans themselves have 
proclaimed that there is no innate or primordial sharing of the African and Antillean 
psyche that might span the Atlantic.95 After “the great white error”, the Antillean 
negro must now recognize that he is “living in the great black mirage”.96  
 
However, in making these critical movements, Fanon does not qualify his own 
Antillean praxis of exorcism but more so universalises its provenance. This is clearly 
evident in his address to the First Congress of Negro Writers in Paris 1956 (likened by 
one of its organizers to a “cultural Bandung”):   
 
the memory of Nazism, the common wretchedness of different men, the common 
enslavement of extensive social groups, the apparition of ‘European colonies’, in other 
words, the institution of a colonial system in the very heart of Europe, the growing 
awareness of workers in the colonizing and racist countries, the evolution of 
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techniques, all this has deeply modified the problem and the manner of approaching 
[racism].”97  
 
Here, Fanon argues that colonial racism has migrated from the visceral apprehension 
of individuals into assumptions and implicit judgements on culture and “certain forms 
of existing”.98 Signified by the Shoah, the sovereign power of the freeman over the 
negro slave now threatens to mutate beyond law to incorporate all whose epidermis 
confesses a less-than human status. There are no hinterlands left anywhere. Exorcism 
of the colonial freeman – masquerading as human – must, therefore, be the global 
liberation strategy for putting afoot a new human.  Precisely by globalising the ethos 
of exorcism Fanon begins to treats the natives of North Africa as if they are Antillean 
negro-slaves. Witness his resignation letter to the Resident Minister: 
 
If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to be a stranger to his 
environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, permanently an alien in his own 
country, lives in a state of absolute depersonalization. What is the status of Algeria? A 
systematized de-humanization.
99
 
 
Thus, in Fanon’s praxis, liberated zones replace tenacious hinterlands in a 
strikingly modernist vision. Yet at one point, Fanon tantalisingly invokes the mobile 
hinterlands of the Caribbean where, in protective and permissive drum circles, 
sufferers are possessed by the ancestral spirits, lose their “limits” and exorcise 
Babylon to “liberate” themselves.100 Could it be, then, that exorcism might work to 
redeem living African pasts rather than brand new futures? Fanon evades the 
provocation because for him these hinterlands are neither authentic nor living. Africa 
- and America, even perhaps India - exist only as elegiac memories of what has been 
callously destroyed by colonial rule.101 Fanon’s is therefore an instrumental 
appreciation of the cultural detritus leftover from the closing of psychic frontiers; by 
happenstance the outrage that accompanies a deep sense of loss could produce in the 
native a realization of self-agency that, channelled positively, would lead to an 
exorcism of the freeman’s colonial rule and the crafting of a new  architecture of 
humanity.102  
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We are left with an abiding friction in Fanon’s praxis. As a psychiatrist, Fanon 
is working from the standpoint of the negro (ex-)slave and is seeking to exorcise the 
despotic freeman from his psyche. His praxis of exorcism is, as I have intonated, by 
necessity a profoundly positive one. Negros, as non-beings, must entirely liberate 
themselves from the colonial relation. But Fanon is clear that in doing so, their 
necessarily violent methods must not lead to replication of the sovereign rule of the   
pater familias-rex; redolent of Nandy’s concerns, Fanon suggests that the wretched of 
the earth must also help white freemen to weave for themselves a new humble skein 
of humanity.103   Nevertheless, the price of Fanon’s radically transformative and 
positive praxis is a phenomenological erasure of the precarious and long defended 
hinterlands of both (African) natives and (Antillean) negroes. Fanon seeks to carve 
out liberated zones; he is not interested in caring for prior inhabitations. Does Fanon 
accept too much of Locke’s architecture at face value? Lest we forget, exorcism is a 
binding oath to evict a demonic presence; it is not an oath to evict all presence. 
 
And what of Nandy? He has no wish to represent the geographical hinterland - 
the villages of India. He is focused, instead, on transforming the native/freeman 
relationship by legitimising the pasts and other selves that emanate from the more 
mobile psychical hinterlands of tradition. A psychiatrist, Nandy has situated himself 
within the freeman’s household as a traitorous native-servant that subverts his 
master’s toleration. There, he seeks first and foremost to reconcile both the native-
servant and the (new and old) pater familias to the hinterlands of tradition that 
surround them. Seeking to draw attention to the pathologies of inhabiting the centre of 
Locke’s colonial architecture, Nandy replies to his native-servant critics that tradition 
per se “is a toothless tiger now”; it is much more important, he argues, to criticize the 
violence emanating from the household that one occupies rather than the native 
villages one has sought to leave behind.104 This is also why Nandy proclaims that 
negatively defined utopias are better than positively defined ones.105 The praxis is a 
careful one. But is it really redemptive if there is no conviction, no positivity, no joy – 
no Felicity - to be garnered from the Indian past?  
 
By Way of Conclusion: Relatable Hinterlands and the Spirit of Bandung 
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 Colonial rule, as formulated by Locke, is dispensed from the freeman’s house 
and radiates outwards in myriad directions to ensnare and enclose aliens and 
subalterns, to close the frontier and dissolve those hinterland spaces – psychical, 
geographical and epistemic. Opposing this colonial architecture stands Fanon, whose 
anger has been so profoundly contagious on a global scale. After all, toleration is a 
ruse that hides genocidal tendencies, and behind the mask of every pater familias 
lurks the genocidal pater familias rex. No wonder so many natives – and their 
intellectual representatives – have shared Fanon’s joy at the prospects of exorcising 
the freeman to inaugurate the dawning of a new humanity.106 Nandy’s care for 
reconciliation is less infectious. In some ways, he expects far too much from the   
pater familias. Nevertheless, Nandy reminds Fanon of a reality so subtle that it can be 
easily overlooked in the forging of a brand new humanity: hinterlands are far more 
tenacious than the freeman has supposed - even in the native psyches of negro slaves.  
 
Read as part of the History of Bandung, Fanon’s project of exorcism has been 
crushed by the ever expanding architecture of post-colonial rule, while the fate of 
Nandy’s project of reconciliation has been that of incorporation. Perhaps these were 
always provincial projects that would never be able to match the globality of Locke’s 
architecture. And yet, retrieval of Nandy and Fanon’s projects through the memory of 
Bandung107 reveals something else. Here, their fates are not determined by the 
sequential domination of the freeman but are rather opened up to decolonial 
alternatives through a generative seedbed of relationality, albeit one that is currently 
hidden under the postcolonial term for possessive accumulation: “South-South trade”. 
Apprehended through the memory of Bandung, Fanon provides the anti-colonial 
impulse and Nandy the decolonial sensibility. Their crossing enlivens the spirit of 
Bandung that proselytises a logic of solidarity other-wise to the post-colonial 
condition: the negro slave is the potential future of all of the freeman’s subjects; but 
the slave, like all others, has a native hinterland to redeem.  
 
This, I submit, is the spirit of Bandung: hinterlands made relational for the 
pursuit of decolonial alternatives. The provocation that this thought piece makes, 
therefore, is that we should be thinking politically around the possibility of relatable 
hinterlands and not only dwelling upon the operations of a global postcolonial 
architecture. After all, the wretched of the earth have always had to rudely criss-cross 
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the paths laid down by colonial rule to retrieve extant passages and to burn new ones. 
Sometimes, in the course of journeying, the epics of India resonate with the chants to 
Africa-Zion. These journeys and crossings are not recorded in colonial History nor in 
the trace of postcoloniality. In their apocryphal testimony lies the prospect that the 
native, negro and freeman might cease to be, while hinterlands might become, simply, 
lands. 
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